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The worlds of humanitarian and development WASH (water supply, sanitation and hygiene) too often 
operate separately, increasing the vulnerability of poor and marginalised people to disease and missed 
socio-economic opportunities. This is especially the case in protracted crises marked by weak 
governance and conflict. Research undertaken at global level and in South Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo identifies the challenges but also positive stories of where and how WASH service 
providers are overcoming the separation. While a hierarchy of perceived and real differences act as a 
wedge to drive the humanitarian and development communities apart, action is possible and can be led 
from the ground up by WASH agencies working at the operational level. 
 
 
Introduction 
Humanitarian emergencies are increasingly protracted. 60% of countries with annual humanitarian appeals 
in 2014 issued appeals for eight or more of the last years (Bennet 2015). At the same time, development 
actors are increasingly having to engage in such contexts, rather than handing over to humanitarian 
counterparts in the face of short-term emergencies. Challenges to effective response in protracted crises 
abound, marked as they often are by insecurity, extreme and unpredictable need, and breakdown of trust 
between populations, government and external agencies (Mosel and Levine 2014). In such contexts, a lack 
of complementarity and collaboration between humanitarian and development WASH actors has heavy 
consequences, making it more costly to provide WASH services, reducing effectiveness of targeting and 
sustainability, and ultimately increasing the vulnerability of poor and marginalised people to disease and 
missed socio-economic opportunities. This division compounds other, well recognised gaps in institutional 
mandates – for example between urban and rural WASH, and between water supply, sanitation and hygiene. 
It extends also to Government agencies responsible for provision of WASH services: for example, 
Ministries of Water rarely having the mandate, resources or human capacity for emergency response, 
beyond rehabilitation of their own systems. 
Research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and supported by UNICEF and the 
World Bank Water and Sanitation Program examined why a disconnect between humanitarian and 
development WASH persists, and what can be done about it. The study draws on extensive consultation 
with global experts, a literature review, and two in-depth case studies in South Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). Yet we also find and look at positive stories of where, and how, agencies, donors 
and governments are managing to achieve greater cooperation and complementarity.1  
We argue that the solutions are available, and it is in the power of WASH practitioners on both 
humanitarian and development sides of the fence to lead real change. The task is to remove the wedge that 
currently drives the two worlds apart – building on the strengths and capacities of existing organisations and 
sector structures from the ground up, rather than inventing new global initiatives from the top down. 
 
The research 
There is limited pre-existing research on what prevents better collaboration and complementarity between 
humanitarian and development WASH. We therefore took a largely inductive approach in place of a pre-
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defined analytical framework, adjusting the research design iteratively to address the core research 
questions, including: 
• How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact 
currently, and historically?  
• How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and 
development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground?  
• What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between 
development and humanitarian WASH at all levels? 
 
Data were gathered through a literature review, interviews with 26 key informants at global level, 
purposively selected for their expertise in the area, and the case studies in South Sudan and DRC, which in 
turn mainly relied on further key informant interviews with representatives of donors, UN agencies, national 
and international non-governmental organisations, and Government (25 interviews in Juba, South Sudan, 
August 2015; 35 interviews in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, DRC, September 2015). Key limitations of the 
research include the small sample of countries experiencing protracted crises, and reliance on key informant 
interviews as main source of data. Wherever possible, we attempted to use information from our various 
sources review to triangulate. The diagnosis and solutions we offer could be subject to further empirical 
testing. 
 
Framing the problem 
Our key finding is that the siloes between humanitarian and development WASH are sustained by a 
hierarchy of perceived differences, which can be visualised as a wedge driving the communities apart 
(Figure 1). This includes differences, contradictions and tensions in:  
• High-level norms, which are expressed in the two communities’ mission statements, principles and 
standards;  
• Incentives, rooted in the international architecture for humanitarian and development assistance and the 
related signals given by funding and accountability arrangements as well as engrained attitudes to risk. 
• Operational processes, including procedures and systems for targeting effort; for implementing new 
services and sustaining existing ones; for recruiting and developing staff; and for dialogue. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The ‘Wedge’ of perceived differences driving humanitarian and development  
WASH communities apart 
 
Source: Authors 
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Towards the top of the wedge, norms and incentives relate to deeply embedded attitudes and ways of 
working that persist across sectors, not just WASH. They can appear insurmountable for those working on 
the ground in a given sector, leaving them powerless to address how resources are allocated and targeted in a 
particular country or province, or to change the day-to-day operational procedures for communication or 
recruitment. But our research uncovered promising examples of how, in spite of the ‘wedge’ being so 
structural, humanitarian and development WASH stakeholders are finding ways to work across the gap, 
under very challenging circumstances. Indeed, this underlies our main argument – that operational staff and 
practitioners can take the initiative to find ways to increase complementarity, without waiting for grand 
global agreements to reform the wider humanitarian and development aid agendas.  
 
Norms 
A norm can be defined as “an established standard of behaviour shared by members of a social group to 
which each member is expected to conform” (CED 2017). Norms of the humanitarian and development 
communities are given expression at different levels, from high-level mission statements to detailed 
implementation standards for individual sectors like WASH. They permeate the cultures of the respective 
communities and feature in how individuals identify themselves and others. In the words of two of our 
interviewees: “humanitarians are saving life, development [specialists] are bureaucrats - it attracts different 
people”; “it is very difficult to have development people understand about humanitarian work, and 
humanitarian 'cowboys' understand about development work”. Examining different expressions of norms, 
however, we find that while simplistic interpretations tend to reinforce a division, through opposing 
stereotypes, there may be more commonality than is often assumed (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. How norms divide but could unite humanitarian and development WASH 
Norm Sign of difference Potential for complementarity 
Mission Perceived differences in mission: 
humanitarian WASH to ‘save lives’. 
Purpose of development WASH 
has strong health dimension but 
extends to other considerations 
e.g. socio-economic opportunity 
Differences largely self-defined; there are key similarities too 
e.g. necessity of WASH for safeguarding public health across 
emergency and non-emergency contexts 
Principles Humanitarian principles such as 
neutrality and independence 
sometimes perceived as 
incompatible with development 
principles such as government 
ownership, especially in politically 
charged contexts 
Principles do not prevent compromise e.g. neutrality and 
independence does not prohibit engaging with government 
entirely. Even in more challenging contexts, collaboration at 
the local level may be possible as an interim step towards 
sector leadership and ownership with the Government e.g. 
through the Healthy Schools and Villages Programme 
(Ecoles et Villages Assainies, EVA/ VEA) in DRC 
Standards Separate sector standards for 
development (MDGs, JMP 
indicators) and humanitarian 
(Sphere standards) WASH  
Opportunities to find complementarity between technical 
standards with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) WASH 
monitoring; e.g. inclusion of refugee camps as extra-
household settings in SDG monitoring 
 
Incentives 
If norms inform how people answer the question ‘What should be done?’, incentives provide direction as to 
why something should be done. Many of the key incentives reinforcing a feeling of separation between 
humanitarian and development WASH appear to relate to how funding is organised. On the humanitarian 
side, for example, unpredictability and annual budgeting cycles conspire to incentivise short cycles of 
planning. In the words of one interviewee for the South Sudan study: “funding for humanitarian 
interventions is short, 1 year, 18 months if you are lucky! Therefore, you come in and you have to spend 
your money and hit your targets quickly, otherwise the donor will give money to the next agency. We are 
too busy to strategise with the development sector, and thus we miss opportunities.” This also suggests that 
it is not just funding modalities, but accountability (for what and to whom) which prevents a more coherent 
and strategic approach. Different attitude to risk, or the costs and benefits associated with action, is also 
apparent. In the words of one donor representative: “in conflict environments and for humanitarian 
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programmes… there is quite a high discount for future benefits. For humanitarian programmes, it is much 
better to have 100 people having access tomorrow [than] to make sure 500 have access in 3 years’ time.” 
From our inductive analysis we discerned three broad categories of incentive to act, or not act, which 
appeared to operate differently, in many instances, for stakeholders in the development and humanitarian 
communities – the finance and related resources to act; the extent of accountability for any action; and the 
risks of action producing negative outcomes (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. How incentives divide but could unite humanitarian and development WASH 
Incentive Sign of difference Potential for commonality 
Finance Different degrees of coherence of development 
and humanitarian funds: more coordination at 
country level in protracted crises for 
humanitarian WASH within cluster architecture; 
Different timeframe and flexibility of funding 
streams: ‘short-sighted, unpredictable’ for 
humanitarian WASH, longer timeframes but 
limited flexibility for development WASH; 
Perceived competition for finance between 
humanitarian and development interventions. 
Humanitarian pooled funds and the associated 
coherence lent by the cluster architecture has 
the potential to incentivise a more strategic 
approach to sector issues; Some donors are 
trying out mechanisms to better enable 
reprogramming of funds in crisis situations e.g. 
World Bank Immediate Response Mechanism; 
Decreasing funding availability could equally 
encourage rationalisation and partnerships 
rather than competition. 
Accountability Existing accountability and reporting systems to 
donors (in turn, based on visibility of the 
crisis/public pressure and geopolitical 
considerations) discourage longer term 
approach focused on end-impact, for both 
humanitarian and development agencies; 
Perceived greater emphasis among 
development programmes for accountability to 
national government. 
Accountability to beneficiaries acknowledged as 
a shared goal for both humanitarian and 
development WASH communities;  
Examples of more effective involvement of and 
accountability to national government exist 
especially in response to specific challenges, 
e.g. cholera containment and prevention in 
South Sudan. 
Risk High levels of risk (or perceptions of it) reinforce 
the short termism and inflexibility of both 
humanitarian and development programmes; 
skew resource allocations; and further 
incentivise a tendency to resort to familiar, 
separate ways of working 
Examples of risk-based programming to retain 
ability to reallocate for emergency response 
where a crisis re-occurs, e.g. DRC WASH 
Consortium cholera rapid response mechanism. 
In more stable contexts, examples of national 
governments leading on emergency 
preparedness. 
 
Operational processes 
The operational level at which interventions are planned, implemented and managed day to day, shows 
many examples of separation. In view of differences in norms and incentives described above, they may 
seem unmoveable. Ways of working, for example community-based approaches that now dominate WASH 
in ‘development mode’, can seem unfeasible when there is an immediate risk of cholera outbreak – 
prompting water trucking and subsidised latrines. The day-to-day opportunities for experts in humanitarian 
and development WASH to interact can also be infrequent. One global-level interviewee argued that “there 
can be schizophrenia” even within the same organisation: “In general, it is very difficult to have a 
meaningful transition from one category to the other.” A donor organisation in South Sudan emphasised the 
simple step of appointing a programme manager with a development background in an organisation 
primarily doing emergency interventions, to help maintain a focus on long-term sustainability, community 
participation, and involvement of government authorities. Perhaps an even bigger issue here is that many 
humanitarian and development WASH agencies still fail to involve locally based organisations with 
contextual experience to navigate complex crises.  
Such operational challenges, of implementation modalities and human resource practices, are summarised 
in Table 3. Others include differences in how resources are targeted and the structures that are intended to 
allow for coordination, but still too often run in parallel between humanitarian and development WASH 
communities. In all cases, as much as we identified challenges at the operational level, our case studies 
offered many suggestions and examples of solutions to increase complementarity, as can be seen also from 
the Box which follows.  
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Table 3. How operational processes divide but could unite humanitarian and development WASH 
Operational 
process 
Sign of difference Potential for complementarity 
Implementation 
modalities 
Perceived polarisation between rapid, supply-
driven and lengthier, demand-driven approaches 
for humanitarian and development WASH 
interventions, respectively; tensions can arise on 
ways to approach and involve communities 
(especially around sanitation) and use of financial 
incentives/ subsidies. 
Examples of agencies working to invest in 
stimulating demand and supporting 
community capacities to meet their own 
WASH needs including in emergency 
contexts – e.g. agreeing a minimum 
package of support for poorest households 
in post-earthquake Nepal, to avoid 
disrupting CLTS-inspired norms around 
open defecation 
Staff 
recruitment and 
development 
Separate career paths reduce potential for 
interaction and finding common ground; short-
term contracts and performance objectives 
(especially for humanitarian agencies) do not 
incentivise long-term perspectives; limited use of 
locally based organisations with contextual 
experience to navigate complex emergencies. 
Some moves to increase collaboration 
across the divide, at least within the same 
organisation e.g. through staff training and 
exchange within UNICEF WASH 
Programme Division 
Distribution and 
targeting of 
resources 
Geographic and thematic compartmentalisation of 
humanitarian and development WASH actors and 
interventions reduces the scope for day to day 
interactions, and risks leaving gaps in delivery; 
mechanistic and often ad hoc definition of what 
constitutes an emergency skews allocation of 
resources. 
Protracted displacement situations in cities, 
are starting to steer attempts at bridging 
humanitarian and development work – see 
studies by ICRC (2015) 
Mechanisms for 
dialogue and 
co-working 
Disconnect between strategic decision-making at 
headquarters and operational management in 
country reinforces siloes and inhibits potential for 
locally-based workarounds; differing involvement 
of national government; limited cross-sector 
dialogue (sectoral siloes overlaid on development-
humanitarian siloes) 
Increasing emphasis on managing transition 
between WASH clusters and government 
processes, with pragmatic consideration of 
national systems’ vulnerability to, and ability 
to prevent and manage, shocks and conflict 
threats.  
 
Box 1. Learning from what has worked:  
examples of complementarity in practice 
 
• Overcoming normative differences: In South Sudan, the Cholera Task Force has shown how a 
specific challenge like cholera can offer a starting point for joint-working, bringing together a range of 
external agencies with Government representatives from both the health and water sectors, for cholera 
mitigation and prevention. 
• Working with risk: In Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation maintained its development programmes after the outbreak of renewed conflict 
through engagement with local partners and careful contextual analysis. 
• Getting finance to support flexibility: The DRC WASH Consortium has built rapid response 
mechanisms into what is ostensibly a development programme, in order to cope with sudden onset 
emergencies – with the support of its donor, the UK Department for International Development. 
• Finding mechanisms for joint working: At Lubumbashi, DRC’s second city and centre of the ex-
province of Katanga, development partners are invited to WASH Cluster meetings to share information 
and improve complementarity. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The above is a very high level summary of the key findings from our review, presented according to the 
framework that we developed, iteratively, to describe a hierarchy of differences. Together, these differences 
act as a wedge driving the humanitarian and development WASH communities apart – but in each case there 
are opportunities to turn perceived difference into the seeds for complementarity and collaboration. 
Differences must ultimately be addressed at all levels, and certainly, some needs go well beyond the WASH 
sector. Reform of the wider development and humanitarian aid architectures to respond to an increasing 
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concentration of poverty and disease in fragile contexts remains essential. And donors must continue with 
the difficult task of providing aid that supports inclusive governments and societies in the countries they 
support, while managing the expectations of their electorates at home. But we would argue that this should 
not prevent action by those focused on WASH – and that there are key opportunities for those working 
directly in implementation and operations to kick-start real change. As such, we recommend: 
• To increase complementarity at operational level: In the short term, WASH implementing agencies 
operating in protracted crises should collaborate to identify their ‘shared priorities’ - a set of 5-10 short, 
actionable statements that both humanitarian and development WASH actors can fully commit to around 
their ways of working.  
• To tackle underlying incentives that inhibit complementarity: In the medium term, WASH implementing 
agencies should advocate that their donors route the majority of their funds via multi-year but flexible 
mechanisms that permit rapid reallocation in emergencies 
• To challenge the cultural and systemic barriers that exist beyond the WASH sector: In the longer term, 
WASH implementing agencies should encourage the key coordination bodies of which they are 
members, such as Sanitation and Water for All or the Global WASH Cluster, to build coalitions with 
other sector platforms to share lessons on improving complementarity and advocate more systemic, 
cross-sectoral change. 
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